South Korean President Says North Korea Can Produce Ten to Twenty Nuclear Weapons Annually
Updated (2 articles)
Lee’s Annual Fissile Output Claim South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced that North Korea can generate enough fissile material each year to fuel ten to twenty nuclear weapons, a figure he presented at his New Year’s press conference. He framed the estimate as evidence of an accelerating arsenal that demands urgent diplomatic action. The claim appears in two Yonhap reports released on Jan 21, 2026 [1][2].
Key Production Sites Identified Lee identified the Yongbyon and Kangson facilities as active highly enriched uranium (HEU) sites, with Yongbyon also producing plutonium. He said the uranium plants collectively generate dozens of kilograms of material annually, enough for multiple warheads given that a single weapon requires only a few kilograms. These details underscore the dual‑track nature of North Korea’s nuclear program [1].
Current Arsenal Size and Future Projections Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) official estimated that North Korea possessed roughly 115–131 uranium‑based and 15–19 plutonium‑based warheads in 2025, totaling about 150 nuclear weapons. Projections anticipate uranium‑based stockpiles rising to approximately 216 by 2030 and 386 by 2040, while plutonium‑based weapons could reach 27 by 2030 and 43 by 2040. The numbers illustrate a trajectory toward several hundred warheads within two decades [1].
Leadership Directive and Diplomatic Strategy In a 2023 party meeting, Kim Jong‑un ordered an exponential expansion of the nuclear arsenal, linking the buildup to strategic objectives. Lee responded by proposing a three‑stage denuclearization process: an initial freeze on production, followed by reduction, and ultimately complete denuclearization. He argues that negotiations should begin with a freeze before moving toward disarmament [1].
Data Source Discrepancy Noted The second Yonhap article repeats Lee’s ten‑to‑twenty bomb estimate but explicitly states that no independent data or external sources back the figure. This contrast highlights the reliance on official statements without corroborating intelligence. Readers should weigh the claim against the lack of independent verification [2].
Sources (2 articles)
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[1]
Yonhap: Lee urges diplomacy as NK can fuel 10–20 weapons yearly, signaling urgency: detailed report provides fissile‑output numbers, identifies Yongbyon and Kangson sites, cites KIDA’s 150‑warhead estimate and future growth projections, and outlines Lee’s three‑stage denuclearization plan .
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[2]
Yonhap: Lee claims North Korea can fuel 10-20 bombs annually: brief piece repeats the 10‑to‑20 bomb claim but notes the absence of independent verification or source data .
Timeline
2023 – Kim Jong‑un orders an “exponential” expansion of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal during a key party meeting, signalling a decisive shift toward rapid weapons growth that underpins later fissile‑material output claims [1].
2025 – The Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) estimates North Korea fields roughly 150 nuclear warheads, comprising 115–131 uranium‑based and 15–19 plutonium‑based weapons, and projects the stockpile could swell to hundreds in the next two decades [1].
Jan 21, 2026 – At a New Year’s press conference, President Lee Jae Myung announces that North Korea’s Yongbyon and Kangson facilities can produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel 10–20 nuclear weapons each year, a figure he says is usually classified and underscores the urgency of diplomatic action [1][2].
Jan 21, 2026 – Lee stresses that Yongbyon also generates plutonium, while both sites yield dozens of kilograms of uranium annually—enough material for multiple warheads—prompting him to call for a three‑stage denuclearization plan (freeze, reduce, then eliminate) to halt the expanding program [1].
Jan 21, 2026 – Lee’s disclosure of the 10–20‑bomb annual capacity and KIDA’s 2025 warhead count fuels projections that uranium‑based warheads could reach 216 by 2030 and 386 by 2040, with plutonium‑based arms climbing to 27 by 2030 and 43 by 2040, highlighting the looming scale of the threat if negotiations stall [1].