U.S. Threatens 100% Tariffs on Korean Memory Chips, Seoul Pushes “No‑Less‑Favorable” Terms After Taiwan Deal

Updated 2026-01-19 21:56:28+00:00 (15 articles)

US warns Korean memory makers of 100% tariffs unless they invest in America. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told industry leaders at Micron’s Syracuse plant that firms face either a 100 % duty or a requirement to build memory capacity in the United States, explicitly naming Samsung Electronics and SK hynix as potential targets [1][2]. The threat is framed as an industrial coercion tool tied to Section 232 national‑security authority [3]. Analysts note the move could destabilize the Korea‑U.S. alliance and strain global supply chains [1].

July bilateral pact grants Korea 15% tariff relief for $350 billion U.S. investment. The July agreement, finalized in November, reduced Korean semiconductor import duties to 15 % in exchange for roughly $350 billion of Korean capital in the United States, including $150 billion for shipbuilding and $200 billion for undefined strategic projects [1][2]. The deal postponed immediate tariff relief pending detailed implementation, and it treats Korean chips similarly to those from larger exporters [1]. Seoul cites the pact as a baseline for demanding “no‑less‑favorable” treatment in future negotiations [5].

Taiwan‑U.S. pact provides zero‑tariff quota and $250 billion investment benchmark. Under the recently signed Taiwan agreement, tariffs on Taiwanese goods were capped at 15 % and semiconductor duties were eliminated for firms that commit at least $250 billion in U.S. investments and provide matching credit guarantees [1][10][12][13][14]. Taiwanese companies may import up to 2.5 times planned capacity duty‑free during construction and 1.5 times after completion, creating a template that Washington appears to use as leverage on Korea [1][3][6][7][8][9]. Seoul views the Taiwan terms as a reference point for its own negotiations [3][5].

Samsung and SK hynix have already pledged about $41 billion in U.S. facilities. Samsung’s U.S. foundry investment totals roughly $37 billion, while SK hynix’s packaging operation adds about $3.87 billion, bringing combined Korean commitments to approximately $41 billion [1][2][3]. These existing footprints give Washington leverage to demand additional concessions, and analysts warn further U.S. pressure could reshape Korean investment strategies [1][2]. The scale of these commitments underscores the high stakes for Korea’s memory‑chip dominance [1].

Seoul insists on “no‑less‑favorable” treatment and convenes emergency talks. The Korean government announced an emergency meeting of industry ministers, emphasizing that the 25 % AI‑chip tariff announced by the Trump administration should have limited impact on memory makers [15]. Trade Minister Yeo Han‑koo extended his U.S. stay to discuss the proclamation, while officials repeatedly invoked the “no‑less‑favorable” principle to seek parity with Taiwan and Japan [5][15]. Ongoing consultations with Washington aim to mitigate any second‑stage tariffs and protect Korea’s 30 % share of U.S. semiconductor imports [3][4].

Sources (14 articles)

Timeline

2024 – TSMC opens its Arizona fabrication plant, built with about $40 bn in U.S. subsidies, marking the first major Taiwanese semiconductor facility on American soil and setting a precedent for later investment pledges[1].

Jan 15, 2026 – The United States and Taiwan sign a reciprocal trade‑investment pact that cuts U.S. tariffs on Taiwanese goods to 15 % (0 % on aircraft parts and generic drugs) and obliges Taiwanese firms to invest at least $250 bn in U.S. chip, clean‑energy and AI capacity, backed by $250 bn in Taiwanese credit guarantees[13][14].

Jan 15, 2026 – Taiwan’s government pledges up to $250 bn in financing to back the pledged private investments, reinforcing the deal’s “backstop” for U.S. chip‑supply security[1].

Jan 15, 2026 – TSMC announces a $165 bn (≈$250 bn total) U.S. investment plan, accelerates construction at its Arizona plant and signals a rapid expansion to meet AI‑driven demand[3].

Jan 15, 2026 – U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick tells CNBC the agreement will help the United States become “self‑sufficient” in chips, emphasizing a goal to “bring chip production home”[1].

Jan 15, 2026 – Seoul convenes an emergency meeting chaired by Industry Minister Kim Jung‑kwan to map a response to Washington’s new 25 % AI‑chip tariff, signaling the highest‑level Korean coordination on the issue[15].

Jan 15, 2026 – Korean Trade Minister Yeo Han‑koo extends his U.S. stay, says the AI‑chip tariff will have a “limited” impact on local makers but warns that a “second‑stage” tariff could follow, pledging close work with domestic firms[15].

Jan 16, 2026 – A senior U.S. official announces that Washington will negotiate separate, country‑by‑country semiconductor tariff agreements, stressing that the Taiwan deal does not set a universal standard[10][11][12][16].

Jan 16, 2026 – The U.S.‑Taiwan pact caps sector‑specific tariffs at 15 % for auto parts, timber and related products, aligning Taiwan with the rates granted to Japan, South Korea and the EU[13][14].

Jan 16, 2026 – The fact sheet accompanying the pact allows Taiwanese firms building new U.S. capacity to import up to 2.5 × their planned output duty‑free during construction and 1.5 × after completion, creating a powerful incentive for rapid plant build‑out[13][14][10].

Jan 16, 2026 – The agreement calls for the creation of world‑class industrial parks in the United States to anchor the expanded Taiwanese chip ecosystem and accelerate reshoring of advanced manufacturing[2].

Jan 16, 2026 – Lutnick states the U.S. aims to shift at least 40 % of Taiwan’s chip supply to American factories, framing the tariff‑investment link as a lever for domestic production growth[4].

Jan 17, 2026 – A U.S. official reiterates that future chip‑tariff deals will be “separate for separate countries,” positioning the Taiwan agreement as a template but not a binding precedent[9].

Jan 17, 2026 – Former President Trump signs a 25 % tariff on certain AI‑related semiconductors under Section 232, hinting at broader future duties on chip imports and re‑exports[9][10].

Jan 17, 2026 – South Korea’s top trade envoy, after a six‑day U.S. visit, says the AI‑chip tariff’s impact is limited but cautions that Washington could unveil a second‑stage tariff, keeping Seoul on high alert[9].

Jan 18, 2026 – At the groundbreaking of Micron’s Syracuse plant, Lutnick warns global memory‑chip makers they face two choices: pay a 100 % tariff or build production in the United States, directly targeting Korean exporters[7].

Jan 18, 2026 – Seoul announces it will pursue “no less favorable” treatment in U.S. chip‑tariff talks, using the Taiwan benchmark as a reference point to protect Korean interests[6].

Jan 18, 2026 – The Korean presidential office schedules briefings from the trade ministry and domestic chipmakers to prepare for negotiations, explicitly studying the U.S.–Taiwan agreement as a possible standard[6].

Jan 18, 2026 – Korean officials note that semiconductors account for roughly 30 % of Korea’s exports to the United States, underscoring the sector’s strategic importance in any tariff settlement[7].

Jan 19, 2026 – Lutnick again warns that any non‑investing memory‑chipmaker could face tariffs up to 100 %, a message aimed at Samsung Electronics and SK hynix as the U.S. tightens pressure on Korea[5].

Jan 19, 2026 – The U.S. leverages Taiwan’s tariff exemption as a model, pressing Korea to expand U.S. footprints; Samsung has already invested ≈$37 bn and SK hynix ≈$3.87 bn in the United States[4].

Jan 19, 2026 – South Korea pledges $350 bn of U.S. investment under its own tariff deal—$150 bn for shipbuilding and $200 bn for other strategic projects—while seeking to align with the “no less favorable” principle[5].

Jan 19, 2026 – Analysts warn that the U.S.’s aggressive, unilateral tariff strategy could undermine the Korea‑U.S. alliance and disrupt global supply chains, given the centrality of Korean chips to worldwide tech production[4].

Future (post‑Jan 19, 2026) – The U.S.–Taiwan pact expects Taiwanese firms to enjoy duty‑free import quotas (2.5 × during construction, 1.5 × after) and to operate within newly created industrial parks, while Korea continues consultations with Washington to secure “no less favorable” terms and to prepare for any possible second‑stage tariffs[2][6][7].